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Summary	  	  Diagrams	   figure	  prominently	   in	  human	  reasoning,	  especially	   in	  science.	  Cognitive	  science	  research	  has	  provided	  important	  insights	  into	  the	  inferences	  afforded	  by	  diagrams	  and	  re-­‐vealed	  differences	  in	  the	  reasoning	  made	  possible	  by	  physically	  instantiated	  diagrams	  and	  merely	  imagined	  ones.	  In	  scientific	  practice,	  diagrams	  figures	  prominently	  both	  in	  the	  way	  scientists	  reason	  about	  data	  and	  in	  how	  they	  conceptualize	  explanatory	  mechanisms.	  	  	  To	   identify	  patterns	   in	  data,	   scientists	  often	  graph	   it.	  While	   some	  graph	   formats,	   such	  as	  line	  graphs,	  are	  used	  widely,	  scientists	  often	  develop	  specialized	  formats	  designed	  to	  reveal	  specific	   types	   of	   patterns	   and	   not	   infrequently	   employ	   multiple	   formats	   to	   present	   the	  same	  data,	  a	  practice	  illustrated	  with	  graph	  formats	  developed	  in	  circadian	  biology.	  Cogni-­‐tive	  scientists	  have	  revealed	  the	  spatial	  reasoning	  and	  iterative	  search	  processes	  scientists	  deploy	  in	  understanding	  graphs.	  	  	  In	  developing	  explanations,	  scientists	  commonly	  diagram	  mechanisms	  they	  take	  to	  be	  re-­‐sponsible	  for	  a	  phenomenon,	  a	  practice	  again	  illustrated	  with	  diagrams	  of	  circadian	  mech-­‐anisms.	  Cognitive	  science	  research	  has	  revealed	  how	  reasoners	  mentally	  animate	  such	  dia-­‐grams	  to	  understand	  how	  a	  mechanism	  generates	  a	  phenomenon.	  	  
1.	  Overview	  	  Human	  reasoning	  is	  often	  presented	  as	  a	  mental	  activity	  in	  which	  we	  apply	  inference	  rules	  to	  mentally	  represented	  sentences.	  In	  the	  19th	  century	  Boole	  presented	  the	  rules	  for	  natu-­‐ral	   deduction	   in	   logic	   as	   formalizing	   the	   rules	   of	   thought.	   Even	   as	   cognitive	   scientists	  moved	  beyond	  rules	  of	  logical	  inference	  as	  characterizing	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  mind,	  they	  tended	  to	  retain	  the	  idea	  that	  cognitive	  operations	  apply	  to	  representations	  that	  are	  encod-­‐ed	   in	   the	  mind	   (e.g.,	   in	  neural	   activity).	  But	   in	   fact	  humans	  often	   reason	  by	   constructing,	  manipulating,	  and	  responding	   to	  external	   representations,	  and	   this	  applies	  as	  well	   to	  de-­‐ductive	  as	   to	  abductive	  and	   inductive	  reasoning.	  Moreover,	   these	  representations	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  those	  of	  language	  but	  include	  diagrams.	  While	  reliance	  on	  diagrams	  extends	  far	  beyond	   science,	   it	   is	   particularly	   important	   in	   science.	   Scientific	   papers	   and	   talks	   are	   re-­‐plete	  with	  diagrams	  and	  these	  are	  often	  the	  primary	  focus	  as	  scientists	  read	  papers	  and	  en-­‐gage	   in	   further	   reasoning	   about	   them.1	  They	   also	   figure	   prominently	   in	   the	   processes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Zacks,	  Levy,	  Tversky,	  and	  Schiano	  (2002)	  determined	  that	  the	  number	  of	  graphs	  in	  scien-­‐tific	  journals	  doubled	  between	  1984	  and	  1994.	  One	  would	  expect	  that	  trend	  has	  continued.	  Although	  many	  journals	  now	  limit	  the	  number	  of	  figures	  that	  can	  appear	  in	  the	  published	  paper,	  they	  have	  increasing	  allowed	  authors	  to	  post	  supplemental	  material,	  which	  often	  includes	  many	  additional	  diagrams.	  Scientists	  clearly	  use	  these	  diagrams	  to	  communicate	  their	  results	  with	  others.	  But	  there	  is	  also	  evidence	  that	  they	  make	  extensive	  use	  of	  these	  diagrams	  in	  their	  own	  thinking—developing	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  to	  be	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  through	  which	  scientists	  analyze	  data	  and	  construct	  their	  explanations.	  Since	  far	  less	  atten-­‐tion	  has	  been	  paid,	  both	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science	  and	  in	  the	  cognitive	  sciences,	  to	  how	  dia-­‐grams	  figure	  in	  reasoning	  activities,	  my	  objective	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  characterize	  what	  is	  known	  about	  how	  people,	  including	  scientists,	  reason	  with	  diagrams.	  	  An	  important	  feature	  of	  diagrams	  is	  that	  they	  are	  processed	  by	  the	  visual	  system,	  which	  in	  primates	  is	  a	  very	  highly	  developed	  system	  for	  extracting	  and	  relating	  information	  received	  by	   the	   eyes	   (approximately	   one	   third	   of	   the	   cerebral	   cortex	   is	   employed	   in	   visual	   pro-­‐cessing).	  I	  begin	  in	  section	  2	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  distinctive	  potential	  of	  diagrams	  to	  support	  reasoning	  by	  enabling	  people	   to	  employ	  visual	  processing	   to	  detect	   specific	  patterns	  and	  organize	  together	  relevant	  pieces	  of	  information	  and	  examine	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  im-­‐ages	  constructed	  in	  one’s	  imagination	  work	  equally	  well.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  employ	  the	  terms	  
diagram	  in	  its	  inclusive	  sense	  in	  which	  it	  involves	  marks	  arranged	  in	  a	  two	  or	  more	  dimen-­‐sional	  layout	  where	  the	  marks	  are	  intended	  to	  stand	  for	  entities	  or	  activities	  or	  information	  extracted	  from	  them	  and	  the	  geometrical	  relations	  between	  the	  marks	  are	  intended	  to	  con-­‐vey	  relations	  between	  the	  things	  represented.	  In	  sections	  3	  and	  4	  I	  will	  discuss	  separately	  two	  types	  of	  diagrams	  that	  I	  designate	  data	  graphs	  and	  mechanism	  diagrams.	  In	  each	  case	  I	  introduce	  the	  discussion	  with	  examples	  from	  one	  field	  of	  biological	  research,	  that	  on	  circa-­‐dian	  rhythms—the	  endogenously	  generate	  oscillations	  with	  a	  period	  of	  approximately	  24	  hours	   that	   are	   entrainable	   to	   the	   light-­‐dark	   cycle	   of	   our	   planet	   and	   that	   regulate	   a	  wide	  range	  of	   physiological	   activities.	   I	   then	  draw	  upon	   cognitive	   science	   research	   relevant	   to	  understanding	   how	   people	   reason	  with	   each	   type	   of	   diagram	   and	   relate	   this	   to	   the	   dia-­‐grams	  used	  in	  the	  science.	  	  	  
2.	  Cognitive	  Affordances	  of	  Diagrams	  and	  Visual	  Images	  	  Two	  different	  traditions	  have	  dominated	  cognitive	  science	  research	  on	  vision.	  One,	  associ-­‐ated	  with	  Marr	  (1982),	  has	  emphasized	  how,	  from	  the	  activation	  of	   individual	  neurons	  in	  the	   retina,	  people	   can	  build	  up	  a	   representation	  of	  what	   is	   seen.	  The	  other,	   advanced	  by	  Gibson	  (1979)	  drew	  attention	  to	  the	  rich	  information,	  often	  highly	  structured,	  available	  to	  the	  visual	   system.	  The	   latter	   is	   especially	   relevant	   to	  addressing	  diagrams,	   since	   they	   in-­‐volve	  structured	  perceptual	  objects	  in	  the	  environment.	  A	  key	  theoretical	  claim	  Gibson	  ad-­‐vanced	  was	   that	  different	  objects	  of	  perception	  afford	  different	  activities	   for	  different	  or-­‐ganisms—the	  back	  of	  a	   chair	  affords	   landing	   for	  an	   insect	  but	  draping	  a	  garment	   for	  hu-­‐mans.	  One	  can	  extend	  the	  account	  of	  affordance	  to	  external	  representations,	  and	  so	  focus,	  as	  Zhang	  (1997)	  does,	  on	  how	  different	  representations	  activate	  different	  cognitive	  opera-­‐tions:	   Different	  representations	  activate	  different	  operations,	  not	  vice	  versa.	  It	  follows	  that	  operations	  are	  representation-­‐specific.	  External	  representations	  activate	  perceptual	  operations,	  such	  as	  searching	  for	  objects	  that	  have	  a	  common	  shape	  and	  inspecting	  whether	   three	   objects	   lie	   on	   a	   straight	   line.	   In	   addition,	   external	   representations	  may	  have	  invariant	  information	  that	  can	  be	  directly	  perceived	  .	   .	   .	  such	  as	  whether	  several	  objects	  are	  spatially	  symmetrical	  to	  each	  other	  and	  whether	  one	  group	  has	  the	  same	  number	  of	  objects	  as	  another	  group.	  Internal	  representations	  activate	  cog-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  explained	  and	  explanatory	  accounts.	  They	  do	  so	  in	  large	  part	  to	  enable	  the	  use	  of	  visual	  processing	  to	  identify	  patterns	  in	  the	  diagrams.	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  operations,	  such	  as	  adding	  several	  numbers	  to	  get	  the	  sum.”	  (pp.	  185-­‐6)	  	  To	  investigate	  how	  diagrams	  afford	  different	  reasoning	  that	  other	  representations,	  Zhang	  compared	  a	  game	  formally	  equivalent	  to	  tic-­‐tac-­‐toe	  in	  which	  players	  pick	  numbers	  from	  the	  pool	   1	   through	  9	  with	   the	   objective	   of	   being	   the	   first	   to	   pick	   three	  numbers	   totaling	  15.	  Representing	  the	  numbers	  on	  a	  tic-­‐tac-­‐toe	  board	  (Figure	  1)	  shows	  that	  the	  two	  games	  are	  formally	   equivalent—all	   sequences	   of	   three	   numbers	   totaling	   15	   can	   be	  mapped	   onto	   a	  winning	  solution	  to	  tic-­‐tac-­‐toe	  and	  vice	  versa.	  Despite	  being	  formally	  equivalent,	  the	  tic-­‐tac-­‐toe	   board	   representation	   engages	   different	   cognitive	   operations	   than	   the	   number	   game	  represented	  as	  picking	  numbers	  from	  a	  pool.	  On	  the	  tic-­‐tac-­‐toe	  board	  players	  can	  identify	  winning	   combinations	   by	   detecting	   lines	   but	   in	   the	   number	   variant	   they	   must	   perform	  arithmetic	  over	  many	   sets	  of	  numbers.	   In	  Zhang’s	   experiments,	   humans	  played	  against	   a	  computer,	  which	  always	  made	  the	  first	  play	  and	  was	  programmed	  never	  to	  lose.	  If	  partici-­‐pants	  chose	   the	  best	  moves,	  however,	   they	  could	  always	  gain	  a	   tie.	  Participants	   required	  much	  longer	  to	  figure	  out	  a	  strategy	  to	  tie	  the	  computer	  when	  playing	  the	  number	  version	  than	   traditional	   tic-­‐tac-­‐toe,	   indicating	   that	   they	   deployed	   different	   operations	   in	   the	   two	  games.	  (See	  Zhang	  &	  Norman,	  1994,	  for	  experiments	  showing	  similar	  results	  with	  variants	  of	  the	  Tower	  of	  Hanoi	  problem	  that	  placed	  different	  demands	  on	  internal	  processes.)	  Zhang	  further	  claims	  that	  by	  limiting	  winning	  strategies	  to	  lines,	  traditional	  tic-­‐tac-­‐toe	  reduces	  the	  cognitive	  demands,	  freeing	  up	  cognitive	  resources	  for	  other	  activities.	  
	  Figure	  1.	  The	  game	  of	  picking	  three	  numbers	  that	  add	  to	  15	  is	  mapped	  onto	  a	  tic-­‐tac-­‐toe	  board,	  establishing	  their	  formal	  equivalence.	  	  	  In	  a	  provocative	  pioneering	  study	  addressing	  the	  question	  “why	  a	  diagram	  is	  (sometimes)	  worth	  10,000	  words?”	  Larkin	  and	  Simon	  (1987)	  also	  focused	  on	  how	  diagrammatic	  repre-­‐sentations	  support	  different	  cognitive	  operations	  appropriate	   than	  sentential	   representa-­‐tions.	  Like	  Zhang,	  they	  focused	  on	  representations	  that	  were	  equivalent	  in	  the	  information	  they	  provided	  but	  turned	  out	  not	  to	  be	  computationally	  equivalent	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  infer-­‐ences	  that	  could	  be	  “drawn	  easily	  and	  quickly	  from	  the	  information	  given	  explicitly	  in	  the	  one”	  could	  not	  be	  drawn	  easily	  and	  quickly	  from	  the	  other.2	  One	  of	  the	  problems	  they	  in-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Kulvicki	  (2013)	  speaks	  in	  terms	  of	  information	  being	  extractable	  where	  there	  is	  a	  feature	  of	  a	  representation	  that	  is	  responsible	  for	  it	  representing	  a	  given	  content	  and	  nothing	  more	  specific	  than	  that.	  This	  helpfully	  focuses	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  how	  the	  representation	  is	  struc-­‐tured,	  but	  does	  not	  draw	  out	  the	  equally	  important	  point	  that	  extracting	  information	  de-­‐pends	  on	  the	  cognitive	  processes	  that	  the	  cognizer	  employs.	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  vestigate	   is	   the	   pulley	   problem	   shown	   in	   Figure	   2,	  where	   the	   task	   is	   to	   find	   the	   ratio	   of	  weights	  at	  which	   the	  system	   is	   in	  equilibrium.	  They	  developed	  a	  set	  of	   rules	   to	  solve	   the	  problem.	   The	   advantage	   of	   the	   pulley	   diagram	   on	   their	   analysis	   is	   that	   it	   locates	   infor-­‐mation	  needed	  to	  apply	  particular	  rules	  at	  nearby	   locations	   in	   the	  diagram	  so	   that	  by	  di-­‐recting	  attention	  to	  a	  location	  a	  person	  can	  secure	  the	  needed	  information.	  In	  the	  sentential	  representation	   the	   information	  needed	   for	   applying	   rules	  was	  dispersed	   so	   that	   the	   rea-­‐soner	  would	  need	  to	  conduct	  multiple	  searches.	  In	  a	  second	  example,	  involving	  a	  geometry	  proof,	  Larkin	  and	  Simon	  show	  how	  a	  diagram	  reduces	  both	  the	  search	  and	  recognition	  de-­‐mands,	   where	   recognition	   utilizes	   the	   resources	   of	   the	   visual	   system	   to	   retrieve	   infor-­‐mation.	  The	  authors	  also	  offer	  three	  examples	  of	  diagrams	  used	  in	  economics	  and	  physics,	  graphs	  and	  vector	  diagrams,	  that	  employ	  not	  actual	  space	  but	  dimensions	  mapped	  to	  space	  and	  argue	  that	  they	  too	  provide	  the	  benefits	  in	  search	  and	  recognition.	  	  	  
	  Figure	  2.	  Larkin	  and	  Simon’s	  pulley	  problem	  presented	  in	  sentential	  form	  on	  the	  left	  and	  in	  a	  diagram	  on	  the	  right.	  	  	  Together,	  these	  two	  studies	  make	  clear	  that	  diagrams	  differ	  from	  other	  representations	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  cognitive	  operations	  they	  elicit	  in	  problem	  solving	  situations.	  Most	  generally,	  diagrams	  as	  visual	  structures	  elicit	  pattern	  detection	  capacities	  whereas	  sentential	  repre-­‐sentations	  require	  linguistic	  processing.	  Larkin	  and	  Simon	  note	  that	  a	  common	  response	  to	  a	  complex	  sentential	  description	  is	  to	  draw	  a	  diagram.	  An	  interesting	  question	  is	  whether	  comparable	  results	  can	  be	  obtained	  by	  mentally	  imagining	  diagrams.	  Pioneering	  studies	  by	  Shepard	  (Cooper	  &	  Shepard,	  1973;	  Shepard	  &	  Metzler,	  1971)	  and	  Kosslyn	  (Kosslyn,	  Ball,	  &	  Reiser,	  1978)	  demonstrated	  that	  people	  can	  rotate	  or	  move	  their	  attention	  across	  a	  mental-­‐ly	  encoded	  image.	  But	  quite	  surprisingly	  Chambers	  and	  Reisberg	  (1985)	  found	  that	  this	  ca-­‐pacity	  is	  severely	  limited.	  They	  presented	  Jastrow’s	  duck-­‐rabbit	  (Figure	  3)	  to	  participants	  sufficiently	   briefly	   that	   they	   could	   only	   form	   one	   interpretation	   of	   the	   figure.	   They	   then	  asked	   the	  participants	   if	   they	   could	   find	  another	   interpretation	  while	   imaging	   the	   figure.	  None	  were	  able	  to	  do	  so	  even	  when	  offered	  guidance.	  Yet,	  when	  they	  were	  allowed	  to	  draw	  a	  figure	  based	  on	  their	  mental	  image,	  all	  participants	  readily	  discovered	  the	  alternative	  in-­‐terpretation.	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  Figure	  3.	  The	  version	  of	  the	  duck-­‐rabbit	  figure	  used	  as	  a	  stimulus	  in	  Chambers	  and	  Reisberg’s	  experiments	  is	  shown	  on	  the	  left.	  The	  other	  two	  versions	  were	  drawn	  by	  participants	  based	  on	  their	  own	  image	  interpreted	  as	  a	  rabbit	  (center)	  and	  as	  a	  duck	  (right).	   From	   these	   they	   were	   readily	   able	   to	   discover	   the	   other	   interpretation,	  something	  they	  could	  not	  do	  from	  their	  mental	  image	  alone.	  	  These	  findings	  inspired	  numerous	  other	  investigations	  into	  the	  human	  ability	  to	  work	  with	  mental	  images	  whose	  results	  present	  a	  complex	  pattern.	  Reed	  and	  Johnsen	  (1975)	  reached	  a	   similar	   conclusion	   as	   Chambers	   and	  Reisberg	  when	   they	   asked	   participants	   to	   employ	  imagery	  to	  determine	  whether	  a	  figure	  was	  contained	  in	  a	  figure	  they	  had	  previously	  stud-­‐ied.	  Yet	  when	  Finke,	  Pinker,	  and	  Farah	  (1989)	  asked	  participants	  to	  construct	   in	   imagery	  complex	   images	   from	   components,	   they	   performed	   well.	   Studies	   by	   Finke	   and	   Slayton	  (1988)	  showed	  that	  many	  participants	  were	  able	  to	  generate	  creative	  images	  from	  simple	  shapes	   in	   imagery	  (the	  drawings	   the	  participants	  produced	  were	   independently	  assessed	  for	  creativity).	  Anderson	  and	  Helstrup	  (1993a,	  1993b)	  set	  out	  to	  explore	  whether	  drawing	  enhanced	   performance	   on	   such	   tasks	   and	   their	   conclusions	   were	   largely	   negative—participants	  produced	  more	  images,	  but	  the	  probability	  of	  generating	  ones	  judged	  creative	  was	  not	  increased:	  “These	  results	  were	  contrary	  to	  the	  initial	  belief,	  shared	  by	  most	  exper-­‐imenters	  and	  subjects	  alike,	  that	  the	  use	  of	  pencil	  and	  paper	  to	  construct	  patterns	  should	  facilitate	  performance.”	  	  	  Verstijnen,	   Van	   Leeuwen,	   Hamel,	   and	  Hennessey	   (2000)	   explored	  whether	   the	   failure	   of	  drawing	  to	  improve	  performance	  might	  be	  due	  to	  insufficient	  training	  in	  drawing.	  Using	  a	  task	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  Reed	  and	  Johnson,	   they	  compared	  those	  without	   formal	  training	   in	  drawing	  with	  design	  students	  who	  had	  two	  years	  of	  courses	   in	  drawing,	  and	  found	  those	  with	   training	   in	   drawing	  performed	  much	  better.	   In	   another	   study	   in	  which	  participants	  were	   required	   to	   create	   new	   objects	   from	   simple	   components,	   Verstijnen,	   van	   Leeuwen,	  Goldschmidt,	   Hamel,	   and	   Hennessey	   (1998)	   found	   that	   drawing	   significantly	   helped	  trained	  drawers	  create	  compound	  objects	  that	  involved	  restructuring	  the	  components	  (e.g.,	  changing	  proportions	  within	  the	  component).	  One	  conclusion	  suggested	  by	  these	  results	  is	  that	  reasoning	  with	  diagrams	  may	  be	  a	  learned	  activity.	  Humans	  spend	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  time	  learning	  to	  read	  and	  write,	  and	  even	  then	  further	  education	  is	  often	  required	  to	  extract	  in-­‐formation	  from	  text	  and	  construct	  and	  evaluate	  linguistic	  arguments.	  Yet,	  perhaps	  because	  vision	  seems	  so	  natural,	  we	  assume	  that	  diagrams	  are	  automatically	  interpretable	  and	  ex-­‐cept	   in	  curricula	   in	  fields	   like	  design,	  we	  provide	  no	  systematic	  education	  in	  constructing	  and	  reasoning	  with	  diagrams.	  Accordingly,	  it	  perhaps	  should	  not	  be	  a	  surprise	  that	  science	  educators	   have	   found	   that	   students	   often	   ignore	   the	   diagrams	   in	   their	   textbooks	   (Cook,	  2008).	  One	  of	  the	  challenges	  in	  teaching	  students	  how	  to	  reasoning	  with	  diagrams	  is	  identi-­‐fying	   what	   cognitive	   operations	   people	   must	   perform	   with	   different	   types	   of	   diagrams.	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   have	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   to	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   some	   of	   these	   operations,	   and	   I	   will	   discuss	  some	  of	  these	  in	  the	  context	  of	  data	  graphs	  and	  mechanism	  diagrams	  in	  the	  next	  two	  sec-­‐tions.	  	  
3.	  Reasoning	  with	  Data	  Graphs	  	  
3.1	  Data	  Graphs	  in	  Circadian	  Biology	  	  	  By	  far	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  diagrams	  that	  figure	  in	  scientific	  papers	  are	  devoted	  to	  graphing	  data.	  Surprisingly,	  given	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  roles	  data	  play	  both	  in	  discovering	  possible	  explanations	   and	   in	   evaluating	   them,	   there	   is	   little	   discussion	   in	   philosophy	   of	   graphing	  practices	  and	  how	  they	  figure	  in	  discovery	  and	  justification.	  Rather,	  the	  focus	  has	  been	  on	  data	  claims	  that	  can	  be	  represented	  sententially.	  Although	  there	  are	  common	  graphic	  for-­‐mats	   that	   are	  highly	   familiar—e.g.,	   line	   graphs	   and	  bar	   graphs—in	   fact	   a	  wide	  variety	  of	  graphic	  formats	  are	  frequently	  used	  in	  science.	  In	  particular	  fields	  scientists	  have	  created	  their	  own	  formats,	  but	  these	  formats	  often	  migrate	  between	  fields.	  Each	  format	  elicits	  spe-­‐cific	  visual	  processing	  operations	  to	   identify	   informative	  patterns.	   In	  addition	  to	  different	  graphic	   formats,	   there	  are	  different	   tasks	   in	  which	  scientists	  present	  data.	   I	   focus	  on	  two	  tasks—delineating	  phenomena	  and	  presenting	  relations	  between	  variables	  that	  are	  taken	  to	  be	  explanatory	  of	  the	  phenomenon.	  	  	  In	   presenting	   phenomena	   as	   the	   target	   of	   scientific	   explanations,	   Bogen	   and	  Woodward	  (1988)	  distinguish	  phenomena	  from	  data.	  They	  argue	  that	  phenomena,	  unlike	  data,	  are	  re-­‐peatable	  regularities	  in	  the	  world.	  Data	  provide	  evidence	  for	  the	  occurrence	  of	  phenomena.	  In	  many	  cases,	  researchers	  delineate	  phenomena	  by	  identifying	  patterns	   in	  data	  they	  col-­‐lect.	   In	   the	   case	  of	   circadian	   rhythms,	   these	   are	  patterns	  of	   activity	   that	   repeat	   every	  24	  hours	  and	  at	  detectable	  by	  visual	  inspection	  of	  diagrams.	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  basic	  diagramming	  techniques	  employs	  a	  Cartesian	  coordinate	  system	  on	  which	  one	  plots	  values	  of	  relevant	  variables	  on	  the	  two	  axes.	  Using	  the	  abscissa	  to	  repre-­‐sent	   time	  and	   the	  ordinate	   for	   the	   value	  of	   a	   variable	   such	   as	   temperature,	   circadian	   re-­‐searchers	   can	  plot	   each	  data	   point	   and	   then	   connect	   them	  by	   lines	   or	   a	   smoothed	   curve	  (Figure	  4,	   left).	  Our	  visual	   system	  readily	   identifies	   the	  oscillatory	  pattern,	  which	  we	  can	  then	  coordinate	  with	  the	  bar	  at	  the	  bottom	  indicting	  periods	  of	  light	  and	  dark	  and	  the	  grey	  regions	  that	  redundantly	  indicate	  periods	  of	  darkness.	  By	  visually	  investigating	  the	  graph,	  one	  can	  detect	  that	  body	  temperature	  rises	  during	  the	  day	  and	  drops	  during	  the	  night,	  var-­‐ying	  by	  about	  2°	  F.	  over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  day.	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  Figure	  4.	  Left:	  Line	  graph	  from	  Koukkari	  and	  Southern	  (2006)	  showing	  the	  circadian	  oscillation	  in	  body	  temperature	  for	  one	  person	  across	  48	  hours.	  Right:	  Example	  ac-­‐togram	  showing	  times	  of	  running	  wheel	  activity	  of	  a	  wild-­‐type	  mouse	  from	  Bunger,	  Wilsbacher,	   Moran,	   Clendenin,	   Radcliffe,	   Hogenesch,	   Simon,	   Takahashi,	   and	  Bradfield	  (2000).	  	  	  A	  line	  graph	  makes	  clear	  that	  the	  value	  of	  a	  variable	  is	  oscillating	  and	  with	  what	  amplitude,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  make	  obvious	  small	  changes	  in	  the	  period	  of	  activity.	  For	  this	  reason,	  circa-­‐dian	   researchers	  developed	  actograms—a	  version	  of	   a	   raster	  plot	  on	  which	   time	  of	   each	  day	  is	  represented	  along	  a	  horizontal	  line	  and	  each	  occurrence	  of	  an	  activity	  (rotation	  of	  a	  running	  wheel	  by	  a	  mouse)	   is	   registered	  as	  a	  hash	  mark.	  Subsequent	  days	  are	  shown	  on	  successive	  lines	  placed	  below	  the	  previous	  one.	  Some	  actograms,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  shown	  on	  the	  right	   in	  Figure	  4,	  double	  plot	   the	  data	  so	   that	  each	  successive	  24-­‐hour	  period	   is	  both	  plotted	  to	  the	  right	  of	  the	  previous	  24-­‐hour	  period	  and	  then	  again	  on	  the	  left	  on	  the	  next	  line.	  Placing	  adjacent	   times	  next	   to	  each	  other	  even	  when	   they	  wrap	  around	  a	  day	  break	  makes	  it	  easier	  to	  track	  detect	  continuous	  activity	  patterns.	  An	  actogram	  renders	  visually	  apparent	  how	  the	  phase	  of	  activity	  changes	  under	  different	  conditions	  such	  as	  exposure	  to	  light.	  In	  this	  actogram,	  the	  mouse	  was	  first	  exposed	  to	  a	  12:12	  light	  dark	  cycle,	  as	  indicated	  by	  the	  letters	  LD	  on	  the	  right	  side,	  with	  the	  periods	  of	  light	  and	  dark	  indicated	  by	  the	  light-­‐dark	  bar	  at	  the	  top.	  From	  day	  15	  to	  day	  47,	  as	  indicated	  by	  the	  letters	  DD	  on	  the	  right	  side,	  the	  mouse	  was	  subjected	  to	  continuous	  darkness.	  On	  day	  37,	  the	  row	  indicated	  by	  the	  ar-­‐row,	  the	  animal	  received	  a	  six-­‐hour	  pulse	  of	  light	  at	  hour	  16.	  It	  was	  returned	  to	  LD	  condi-­‐tions	  on	  day	  48,	  but	  returned	  to	  DD	  on	  day	  67.	  The	  activity	  records	  shown	  on	  the	  actogram	  exhibit	  a	  clear	  pattern.	  During	  both	  LD	  periods	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  mouse	  was	  entrained	  to	  the	  pattern	  of	  light	  and	  dark	  so	  that	  the	  mouse	  was	  primarily	  active	  during	  the	  early	  night,	  with	  a	  late	  bout	  of	  activity	  late	  in	  the	  night	  (mice	  are	  nocturnal	  animals).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  during	  the	  DD	  periods	  the	  mouse	  began	  its	  activity	  somewhat	  earlier	  each	  day,	  a	  phenome-­‐non	  known	  as	  free	  running.	  The	  light	  pulse	  reset	  the	  onset	  time	  for	  activity	  on	  the	  following	  day,	  after	  which	  the	  mouse	  continued	  to	   free	  run	  but	   from	  this	  new	  starting	  point.	  When	  switched	  back	  to	  LD	  the	  mouse	  exhibited	  a	  major	  alternation	  in	  activity	  the	  next	  day,	  but	  it	  took	  a	  couple	  more	  days	  to	  fully	  re-­‐entrain	  to	  the	  LD	  pattern.	  	  	  Data	  graphs	  are	  used	  not	   just	   to	  characterize	  phenomena	  but	  also	  to	   identify	   factors	   that	  may	  play	  a	  role	  in	  explaining	  phenomena.	  Figures	  in	  biological	  papers	  often	  contain	  many	  panels,	  invoking	  different	  representational	  formats,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  attempt	  to	  make	  visible	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  relationship	  between	  variables	  that	  are	  taken	  to	  be	  potentially	  explanatory.	   	  For	  example,	  Figure	  5,	  from	  Maywood,	  Reddy,	  Wong,	  O'Neill,	  O'Brien,	  McMahon,	  Harmar,	  Okamura,	  and	  Hastings	  (2006),	  employs	  photographs,	  line	  graphs,	  heat	  maps,	  and	  radial	  (Rayleigh)	  plots.	  To	  situate	  their	  research,	  in	  the	  1970s	  the	  suprachiasmatic	  nucleus	  (SCN),	  a	  small	  structure	  in	  the	  hypothalamus,	  was	  implicated	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  techniques	  as	  the	  locus	  of	  circadi-­‐an	  rhythms	  in	  mammals.	  Welsh,	  Logothetis,	  Meister,	  and	  Reppert	  (1995)	  had	  demonstrated	  that	  while	   individual	   SCN	  neurons	  maintain	   rhythmicity	  when	  dispersed	   in	   culture,	   they	  oscillate	  with	   varying	   periods	   and	   quickly	   become	   desynchronized.	  Maywood	   et	   al.’s	   re-­‐search	   targeted	   vasoactive	   intestinal	   polypeptide	   (VIP),	   which	   is	   released	   by	   some	   SCN	  neurons,	  as	  the	  agent	  that	  maintains	  synchrony	  in	  the	  whole	  SCN	  or	  in	  slices	  from	  the	  SCN.	  Accordingly,	   they	  compared	  SCN	  slices	   from	  mice	   in	  which	  one	  (identified	  as	  VIP2r+/-­‐)	  or	  both	  copies	  (VIP2r-­‐/-­‐)	  of	  the	  gene	  that	  codes	  for	  the	  VIP	  receptor	  are	  deleted.	  To	  render	  the	  rhythmicity	  of	  individual	  cells	  visible,	  the	  researchers	  inserted	  a	  gene	  coding	  for	  luciferase	  under	  control	  of	  the	  promoter	  for	  a	  known	  clock	  gene,	  Per1,	  so	  as	  to	  produce	  luminescence	  whenever	  PER	  is	  synthesized.	  The	  photographs	  in	  panels	  A	  are	  selections	  among	  the	  raw	  data.	  They	  make	  clear	  that	  VIP	  luminescence	  in	  the	  slice	  is	  synchronized,	  occurring	  at	  hour	  48	   and	   72.	   Panel	   E	   reveals	   the	   lack	   of	   synchrony	  without	   the	  VPN	   receptor	   and	   panel	   F	  demonstrates	   that	   individual	   neurons	   are	   still	   oscillating	  without	   VIP	   but	   that	   the	   three	  neurons	  indicted	  by	  green,	  blue,	  and	  red	  arrows	  exhibit	  luminescence	  at	  different	  phases.	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  Figure	  5.	  By	  using	  multiple	  graphical	   formats	  (photographs	  of	  slices	  from	  the	  SCN,	  line	  graphs,	  raster	  plots	  (heat	  maps)	  and	  radial	  (Rayleigh)	  plots,	  Maywood,	  Reddy,	  Wong,	  O'Neill,	  O'Brien,	  McMahon,	  Harmar,	  Okamura,	  and	  Hastings	  (2006)	  make	  ap-­‐parent,	   when	   a	   receptor	   for	   VIP	   is	   present,	   oscillations	   of	   individual	   neurons	   are	  synchronized	  but	  that	  this	  is	  lost	  without	  VIP.	  	  	  Although	  the	  photographs	  are	  sufficient	  to	  show	  that	  VIP	  is	  potentially	  explanatory	  of	  syn-­‐chronous	   activity	   in	   the	   SCN,	   the	   researchers	   desired	   to	   characterize	   the	   relationship	   in	  more	  detail.	  They	  began	  by	  quantifying	   the	  bioluminescence	   recorded	  at	   the	   locus	  of	   the	  cell	  in	  photographs	  at	  different	  times.	  In	  panels	  B	  and	  G	  they	  displayed	  the	  results	  for	  five	  individual	  cells	   in	  each	  of	  each	  type	  in	   line	  graphs.	  This	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  while	  there	  is	  variation	   in	  amplitude,	  with	  VIP	  the	  five	  cells	  are	   in	  phase	  with	  each	  other	  while	  without	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  they	  are	  not.	  Even	  with	  five	  cells,	  though,	  it	  becomes	  difficult	  to	  decipher	  the	  pattern	  in	  a	  line	  graph.	  The	  raster	  plots	  in	  panels	  C	  and	  H	  enable	  comparison	  of	  25	  cells,	  one	  on	  each	  line,	  with	  red	  indicating	  periods	  when	  bioluminescence	  exceeds	  a	  threshold	  and	  green	  pe-­‐riods	  when	   it	   is	   below	   the	   threshold	   (such	   displays	   using	   hot	   and	   cold	   colors	   are	   often	  called	  heat	  maps).	  The	  raster	  plot	  enables	  one	  to	  compare	  the	  periodicity	  of	  individual	  cells	  more	  clearly,	  but	  with	  a	  loss	  of	  information	  about	  the	  amplitude	  of	  the	  oscillation	  at	  differ-­‐ent	  times.	  The	  Rayleigh	  plots	  shown	  in	  panels	  D	  and	  I	  sacrifice	  even	  more	  information,	  fo-­‐cusing	  only	  on	  peak	  activity,	  but	  show	  that	  the	  peak	  phases	  are	  highly	  clustered	  with	  VIP	  and	  widely	  distributed	  without.	  The	  blue	  arrow	  shows	  the	  aggregate	  phase	  vector	  and	  in-­‐dicates	  not	  only	  that	  it	  is	  oriented	  differently	  without	  VIP	  but	  also	  is	  extremely	  short,	  indic-­‐ative	  of	  little	  correlation	  between	  individual	  neurons.	  	  
3.2	  Cognitive	  science	  research	  relevant	  to	  reasoning	  with	  graphs	  	  Having	  introduced	  examples	  of	  graphs	  used	  in	  one	  field	  of	  biology,	  I	  turn	  now	  to	  cognitive	  science	  research	  that	  has	  attempted	  to	  identify	  aspects	  of	  the	  cognitive	  operations	  that	  fig-­‐ure	  in	  reasoning	  with	  graphs.	  Pinker	  (1990)	  provided	  the	  foundation	  for	  much	  subsequent	  research	  on	  how	  people	   comprehend	   graphs.	  He	  differentiated	   the	   cognitive	   activities	   of	  creating	  a	  visual	  description	  of	  a	  graph	  and	  applying	  an	  appropriate	  graph	  schema	  to	  it.	  He	  treats	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  visual	  description	  as	  initially	  a	  bottom	  up	  activity	  driven	  by	  the	  visual	  stimulus	  to	  which	  gestalt	  principles	  such	  as	  proximity	  and	  good	  continuation,	  among	  other	  procedures,	  are	  invoked.	  As	  explored	  by	  Zacks	  and	  Tversky	  (1999),	  these	  principles	  differentially	  affect	  perception	  of	  bar	  graphs	  and	  line	  graphs:	  “Bars	  are	   like	  containers	  or	  fences,	   which	   enclose	   one	   set	   of	   entities	   and	   separate	   them	   from	   others.	   Lines	   are	   like	  paths	  or	  outstretched	  hands,	  which	  connect	  separate	  entities”	  (p.	  1073).	  The	  result,	  which	  has	  been	  documented	  in	  many	  studies,	  is	  that	  people	  are	  faster	  and	  more	  accurate	  at	  read-­‐ing	  individual	  data	  points	  from	  bar	  graphs	  than	  line	  graphs	  but	  detect	  trends	  more	  easily	  in	  line	  graphs	  (Simcox,	  1984;	  Carswell	  &	  Wickens,	  1987).	  For	  example,	  the	  bar	  graph	  on	  the	  left	  in	  Figure	  6	  makes	  it	  easy	  to	  read	  off	  test	  scores	  at	  different	  noise	  levels	  and	  room	  tem-­‐peratures,	  and	  to	  compare	  test	  scores	  at	  the	  two	  temperatures.	  The	  line	  graph	  in	  the	  mid-­‐dle	  encodes	  the	  same	  data	  but	  the	  lines	  connecting	  the	  values	  at	  the	  two	  noise	  levels	  make	  that	  comparison	  more	  apparent.	  Moreover,	  the	  line	  graph	  suggests	  that	  there	  are	  interme-­‐diate	  values	  between	  the	  two	  explicitly	  plotted.	  The	  effect	  is	  sufficiently	  strong	  that	  Zacks	  and	  Tversky	  found	  that	  when	  line	  graphs	  are	  used	  with	  categorical	  variables,	  viewers	  often	  treat	  them	  as	  interval	  variables	  and	  make	  assertions	  such	  as	  “The	  more	  male	  a	  person	  is,	  the	  taller	  he/she	  is”	  (p.	  1076).	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  6.	  A	  bar	  graph	  on	  the	  left	  and	  two	  line	  graphs,	  each	  showing	  the	  same	  data,	  but	  which	  viewers	  typically	  interpret	  differently.	  From	  Shah	  and	  Hoeffner	  (2002).	  	  The	  choice	  of	  what	  to	  present	  on	  the	  axes	  also	  affects	  the	  information	  people	  extract.	  Shah	  and	  Carpenter	  (1995)	  found	  that	  participants	  produce	  very	  different	  interpretations	  of	  the	  two	  graphs	  on	  the	  right	  of	  Figure	  6,	  one	  representing	  noise	  and	  the	  other	  room	  tempera-­‐ture	  on	  the	  abscissa.	  Thus,	  viewers	  of	  the	  graph	  in	  the	  center	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  notice	  the	  trend	  with	  increasing	  noise	  levels	  whereas	  those	  viewing	  the	  graph	  on	  the	  right	  notice	  the	  trend	  with	  increasing	  temperature.	  Further,	  when	  lines	  in	  graphs	  have	  reverse	  slopes,	  as	  in	  the	   rightmost	  graph,	  participants	   take	   longer	   to	  process	   the	  graph.	  Moreover,	   this	  differ-­‐ence	  makes	  the	  third	  variable,	  noise	  level,	  more	  salient	  since	  it	  identifies	  the	  difference	  re-­‐sponsible	  for	  the	  contrasting	  slopes.	  	  	  The	  research	  reported	  so	   far	   focused	  on	  visual	   features	  of	  graphs,	  but	  one	  of	   the	  seminal	  findings	  about	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  mammalian	  visual	  processing	  system	  is	  that	  it	  is	  dif-­‐ferentiated	   into	   two	  processing	   streams,	  one	  extracting	   information	  about	   the	   shape	  and	  identity	  of	  objects	  and	  one	  extracting	   information	  about	   location	  and	  potential	   for	  action	  (Ungerleider	   &	   Mishkin,	   1982;	   van	   Essen	   &	   Gallant,	   1994).	   Hegarty	   and	   Kozhevnikov	  (1999)	   proposed	   that	   the	   distinction	   between	   different	   processing	   pathways	   could	   help	  explain	  apparently	  contradictory	  results	  other	  researchers	  had	  reached	  about	  whether	  skill	  in	   visual	   imagery	   facilitates	   solving	   mathematics	   problems.	   They	   separately	   evaluated	  sixth-­‐grade	  boys	   in	  Dublin,	   Ireland	   in	   terms	  of	  pictorial	   imagery	   (“constructing	  vivid	  and	  detailed	  images”)	  and	  schematic	  imagery	  (“representing	  the	  spatial	  relationships	  between	  objects	  and	  imagining	  spatial	  transformations”).	  The	  found	  that	  good	  pictorial	  imagery	  was	  actually	   associated	   with	   poorer	   performance	   in	   solving	   mathematical	   problems,3	  while	  good	  spatial	  imagery	  was	  associated	  with	  better	  performance.	  In	  subsequent	  work	  Hegarty	  and	  her	  collaborators	  focused	  on	  kinetic	  problems	  involving	  graphs	  of	  motion	  and	  demon-­‐strated	  a	  similar	  effect	  of	  pictorial	  versus	  spatial	  visualization.	  Kozhevnikov,	  Hegarty,	  and	  Mayer	  (2002)	  presented	  graphs	  such	  as	  that	  on	  the	  left	  in	  Figure	  8	  to	  participants	  who,	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  psychometric	  tests,	  scored	  high	  or	  low	  on	  spatial	  ability.	  Those	  who	  scored	  low	  interpreted	  this	  graph	  pictorially	  as,	  for	  example,	  a	  car	  moving	  on	  a	  level	  surface,	  then	  go-­‐ing	   down	   a	   hill,	   and	   then	  moving	   again	   along	   a	   level	   surface.	  None	   of	   these	   participants	  could	  provide	  the	  correct	  interpretation	  of	  the	  graph	  as	  showing	  an	  object	  initially	  at	  rest,	  then	  moving	  at	  a	  constant	  velocity,	  and	  finally	  again	  at	  rest.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  all	  partici-­‐pants	  who	  scored	  high	  on	  spatial	  ability	  provided	  the	  correct	  interpretation.	  Subsequently,	  Kozhevnikov,	  Kosslyn,	  and	  Shephard	  (2005)	  examined	  the	  differences	  between	  profession-­‐als	   in	   the	  arts	  and	   the	   sciences	  with	   respect	   to	   these	  graphs.	  They	   found	   that,	   except	   for	  participants	  who	   provided	   an	   irrelevant	   interpretation	   by	   focusing	   on	   non-­‐pictorial	   fea-­‐tures	  of	  the	  graph,	  artists	  tended	  to	  provide	  a	  literal	  pictorial	  interpretation	  of	  the	  path	  of	  movement	  whereas	   all	   scientists	   offered	   a	   correct	   schematic	   interpretation	   (example	   re-­‐sponses	  are	  shown	  on	  the	  right	  of	  figure	  7).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  following	  was	  a	  typical	  problem:	  “At	  each	  of	  the	  two	  ends	  of	  a	  straight	  path,	  a	  man	  planted	  a	  tree	  and	  then	  every	  5	  meters	  along	  the	  path	  he	  planted	  another	  tree.	  The	  length	  of	  the	  path	  is	  15	  meters.	  How	  many	  trees	  were	  planted?”	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  Figure	  7.	  On	  the	  left	  is	  a	  line	  graph	  showing	  an	  object	  initially	  at	  rest,	  then	  moving	  for	  a	  period	  at	  a	  constant	  velocity,	  then	  returning	  to	  rest	  that	  Kozhevnikov,	  Kosslyn,	  and	   Shephard	   (2005)	   used	   to	   compare	   interpretations	   by	   artists	   and	   scientists.	   A	  typical	  response	  from	  an	  artist	  is	  shown	  at	  the	  top	  right	  whereas	  one	  from	  a	  scien-­‐tist	  is	  shown	  at	  the	  bottom.	  	  	  So	   far	   I	   have	   focused	   on	   viewing	   a	   graph	   and	   extracting	   information	   from	   it.	   But	   an	   im-­‐portant	  feature	  of	  graphs	  in	  science	  such	  as	  those	  I	  presented	  in	  the	  earlier	  section	  is	  that	  they	  afford	  multiple	  engagements	  in	  which	  a	  user	  visually	  scans	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  graph	  seeking	   answers	   to	   different	   questions,	   some	   posed	   by	   information	   just	   encountered.	  Carpenter	  and	  Shah	  (1998)	  drew	  attention	  to	  this	  by	  observing	  that	  graph	  comprehension	  is	  an	  extended	  activity	  often	  requiring	  half	  a	  minute,	  two	  orders	  of	  magnitude	  longer	  than	  the	  time	  required	  to	  recognize	  simple	  patterns,	  including	  words	  and	  objects.	  In	  addition	  to	  detecting	  a	  pattern	  of	  data	  points	  along,	  e.g.,	  a	  positively	  sloping	  line,	  the	  graph	  interpreter	  must	  relate	  these	  points	  to	  the	  labels	  on	  the	  axes	  and	  what	  these	  represent	  and	  this	  is	  what	  requires	   processing	   time.	   Using	   eye	   tracking	  which	   participants	   study	   graphs,	   Carpenter	  and	  Shah	  revealed	  that	  viewers	  initially	  carve	  the	  graph	  into	  visual	  chunks	  and	  then	  cycle	  through	  focusing	  on	  different	  components—the	  pattern	  of	  the	  lines,	  the	  labels	  on	  the	  axes,	  the	   legend,	   and	   the	   title	   of	   the	   graph	   (Figure	   8).	   Similarly	   drawing	   attention	   to	   the	   pro-­‐longed	   engagement	   individuals	   often	   have	  with	   graphs,	   Trickett	   and	  Trafton	   (2006)	   em-­‐ployed	  verbal	  protocols	  as	  well	  as	  eye	  tracking	  to	  study	  what	  people	  do	  when	  making	  in-­‐ferences	   that	  go	  beyond	  what	   is	   explicitly	   represented	   in	  a	  given	  graph.	  They	   found	   that	  participants	  often	  employ	  spatial	  manipulations	  such	  as	  mentally	  transforming	  an	  object	  or	  extending	  it;	  they	  are	  not	  just	  passively	  viewing	  it.	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  Figure	  8.	  Graph	  (left)	  and	  superimposed	  eye-­‐tracking	  results	  (right)	  from	  Carpenter	  and	  Shah	  (1998).	  	  Cognitive	  scientists	  have	   limited	   their	   focus	   to	  relatively	  simple	  graph	   forms	  such	  as	   line	  graphs	  and	  have	  not	  investigated	  the	  larger	  range	  of	  format	  we	  saw	  deployed	  in	  circadian	  research.	  Many	  of	  the	  results,	  however,	  are	  applicable	  to	  these	  other	  graph	  formats.	  Gestalt	  principles	  such	  as	  good	  continuation	  affect	  the	  patterns	  people	  see	  in	  actograms	  and	  raster	  plots	  (heat	  maps).	  In	  the	  actogram	  in	  Figure	  4	  one	  recognizes	  the	  phase	  locking	  of	  activity	  to	  the	  light-­‐dark	  cycle	  and	  daily	  phase	  advance	  when	  light	  cues	  are	  removed	  by	  implicitly	  (and	  sometimes	  explicitly)	  drawing	  a	  line	  through	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  each	  day’s	  activity.	  Spatial	  processing	  is	  clearly	  important	  not	  only	  with	  the	  photographs	  in	  Figure	  5	  but	  also	  with	   the	   heat	  map	   and	  Rayleigh	  plot.	   A	   skilled	   user	   of	   these	   graphs	  must	   recognize	   that	  space	  in	  the	  photographs	  corresponds	  to	  space	  on	  the	  slice	  from	  the	  brain	  but	  that	  space	  in	  the	  heat	  map	  corresponds	  not	   to	  physical	   space	  but	   an	  abstract	   space	   in	  which	  different	  cells	   are	   aligned.	   Finally,	   these	   diagrams	   are	   not	   designed	   to	   convey	   information	   in	   one	  look	  but	  rather	  are	  objects	  that	  afford	  shifting	  one’s	  attention	  many	  times	  to	  focus	  on	  dif-­‐ferent	  information.	  With	  the	  Rayleigh	  plot,	  for	  example,	  one	  typically	  attends	  separately	  to	  the	  dispersal	  of	  blue	  arrowheads	  reflecting	  peaks	  of	  individual	  cells	  and	  to	  the	  vector	  indi-­‐cating	  the	  population	  average.	  If	  eye	  tracking	  were	  performed,	  the	  pattern	  would	  likely	  re-­‐semble	  that	  displayed	  in	  Figure	  8.	  With	  panels	  showing	  the	  same	  information	  in	  multiple	  formats,	  as	  in	  Figure	  5	  viewers	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  shift	  their	  focus	  between	  panels	  to	  see,	  for	  example,	  how	  the	  times	  in	  the	  line	  graph	  correspond	  to	  those	  in	  the	  photograph	  or	  those	  in	  the	  heat	  map.	  One	  limitation	  of	  the	  cognitive	  science	  studies	  is	  that	  the	  tasks	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  perform	  were	  usually	  quite	  limited	  (e.g.,	  interpret	  the	  graph)	  whereas	  scien-­‐tists	  often	  use	   interact	  with	  graphs	  over	  multiple	  engagements,	  constructing	  new	  queries	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  previous	  ones	  (e.g.,	  probing	  an	  actogram	  to	  see	  if	  the	  behavior	  really	  does	  look	   rhythmic	   or	   not	   or	   exploring	   the	   variability	   between	   cells	   revealed	   in	   a	   heat	  map).	  This	  is	  particularly	  evident	  when	  a	  researcher	  pours	  over	  a	  graph	  after	  producing	  it	  to	  de-­‐termine	  what	  it	  means	  or	  when,	  in	  a	  journal	  club	  discussion,	  other	  researchers	  raise	  ques-­‐tions	  about	  specific	  features	  of	  a	  graph.	  Ultimately	  we	  need	  to	  better	  understand	  how	  sci-­‐entists	  pose	  and	  address	  such	  queries	  over	  time	  if	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  the	  different	  roles	  graphs	  play	  in	  scientific	  reasoning.	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4.	  Reasoning	  with	  Mechanism	  Diagrams	  	  
4.1	  Mechanism	  diagrams	  in	  circadian	  biology	  
	  Recognizing	  that	  individual	  activities,	  even	  if	  they	  do	  play	  a	  causal	  role	  in	  generating	  a	  phe-­‐nomenon,	   typically	   do	   not	   work	   in	   isolation	   but	   only	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   mechanism	   in	  which	  they	  interact	  with	  other	  components,	  biologists	  often	  set	  as	  their	  goal	  to	  characterize	  the	  mechanism.4	  The	  researchers’	  conception	  of	  the	  mechanism	  is	  sometimes	  presented	  in	  a	  final	  figure	  in	  a	  journal	  article	  but	  mechanism	  diagrams	  are	  even	  more	  common	  in	  review	  papers.	  Figure	  9	   is	  a	   representative	  sample	  of	  a	  mechanism	  diagram	   for	   the	   intracellular	  oscillator	   in	   mammalian	   SCN	   neurons.	   The	   diagram	   uses	   glyphs—“simple	   figures	   like	  points,	   lines,	   blobs,	   and	   arrows,	   which	   derive	   their	   meaning	   from	   geometric	   or	   gestalt	  properties	  in	  context”	  (Tversky,	  2011)	  to	  represent	  the	  parts	  and	  operations	  of	  the	  mecha-­‐nism.5	  The	  parts	  shown	  include	  DNA	  strands,	  shown	  as	  two	  wavy	  lines,	  on	  which	  promoter	  regions	  are	  indicated	  by	  lightly-­‐shaded	  rectangles,	  genes	  by	  darkly	  colored	  rectangles,	  and	  protein	  products,	  by	   colored	  ovals.	  Lines	  with	  arrow	  heads	   represent	  operations	   such	  as	  expression	  of	  a	  gene	  or	  transport	  of	  proteins	  to	  locations	  where	  they	  figure	  in	  other	  reac-­‐tions,	   including	  activating	  gene	  transcription.	  Lines	  with	  squared	  ends	   indicate	   inhibitory	  activity.	   When	   phosphates	   attach	   to	   molecules	   (as	   preparation	   for	   nuclear	   transport	   or	  degradation),	  they	  are	  are	  shown	  as	  white	  circles	  containing	  a	  P.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  appeals	  to	  mechanism	  to	  explain	  biological	  phenomena,	  see	  Bechtel	  and	  Richardson	  (1993/2010);	  Bechtel	  and	  Abrahamsen	  (2005);	  Machamer,	  Darden,	  and	  Craver	  (2000).	  5	  Tversky	  emphasizes	  the	  abstractness	  of	  glyphs	  over	  more	  iconic	  representations,	  arguing	  that	  the	  abstractness	  promotes	  generalization.	  One	  can	  abstract	  even	  more	  by	  allowing	  on-­‐ly	  one	  type	  of	  glyph	  (e.g.,	  a	  circle)	  for	  a	  entity	  and	  one	  for	  an	  operation	  (an	  arrow),	  generat-­‐ing	  the	  sort	  of	  representations	  found	  in	  graph	  theory	  and	  used	  to	  capture	  general	  conse-­‐quences	  of	  the	  organization	  of	  mechanisms.	  See	  Bechtel	  (in	  press).	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  Figure	  9.	  Takahashi,	  Hong,	  Ko,	  and	  McDearmon	  (2008)	  mechanism	  diagram	  of	   the	  mammalian	  circadian	  clock	  involve	  genes	  and	  proteins	  within	  individual	  cells.	  	  	  The	  diagram	  is	  clearly	  laid	  out	  spatially,	  but	  only	  some	  features	  of	  the	  diagram	  convey	  in-­‐formation	  about	  spatial	  structures	   in	  the	  cell.	  The	  differentiation	  of	  the	  nucleus	  and	  cyto-­‐plasm	  is	  intended	  to	  correspond	  to	  these	  regions	  in	  the	  cell	  and	  lines	  crossing	  the	  boundary	  between	  the	  nucleus	  and	  cytoplasm	  represent	  transport	  between	  the	  two	  parts	  of	  the	  cell.	  Beyond	   that,	   however,	   the	   distribution	   of	   shapes	   and	   arrows	   conveys	   no	   spatial	   infor-­‐mation	   but	   only	   functional	   differentiation.	   The	  most	   important	   operations	   shown	   in	   this	  diagram	  are	   the	   synthesis	  of	  REV-­‐ERBA	  and	   its	   subsequent	   transport	   into	   the	  nucleus	   to	  inhibit	  transcription	  of	  BMAL1	  (shown	  as	  a	  loop	  out	  from	  and	  back	  into	  the	  nucleus	  in	  the	  upper	  left)	  and	  the	  synthesis	  of	  PER	  and	  CRY,	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  dimer,	  and	  the	  transport	  of	  the	  dimer	  into	  the	  nucleus	  to	  inhibit	  the	  ability	  of	  BMAL1	  and	  CLOCK	  to	  activate	  transcrip-­‐tion	  of	  BMAL1,	  PER,	  and	  CRY	  (shown	  as	  a	   loop	  out	  from	  and	  back	  into	  the	  nucleus	  in	  the	  center-­‐left	  of	  the	  figure).	  (The	  other	  operations	  shown	  are	  those	  involved	  in	  signaling	  from	  outside	  the	  cell	  that	  regulates	  the	  overall	  process,	  in	  the	  degradation	  of	  PER	  and	  CRY,	  and	  in	  the	  expression	  of	  Clock-­‐Controlled	  Genes	  [CCG]	  that	  constitute	  the	  output	  of	  the	  clock.	  	  For	  someone	  acquainted	  with	  the	  types	  of	  parts	  shown	  and	  the	  operations	   in	  which	  they	  engage,	  a	  diagram	  such	  as	  this	  provides	  a	  means	  of	  showing	  schematically	  how	  the	  various	  parts	  perform	  operations	  that	  affect	  other	  parts.	  One	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  take	  in	  the	  whole	  diagram	  at	  once,	  but	  to	  follow	  the	  operations	  from	  one	  part	  to	  another.	  To	  understand	  how	  the	  mechanism	  gives	  rise	  to	  oscillatory	  activity,	  one	  can	  mentally	  simulate	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  mechanism	  by	  starting	  in	  the	  middle	  with	  the	  Per	  and	  Cry	  genes.	  As	  they	  are	  expressed,	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  more	  PER	  and	  CRY	  proteins	  are	  generated.	  After	  the	  proteins	  form	  a	  dimer	  and	  are	  trans-­‐ported	   into	   the	  nucleus,	   they	   inhibit	   the	  activity	  of	   the	  BMAL1:CLOCK	  dimer	  and	  thereby	  stop	  their	  own	  expression.	  This	  reduction	  in	  express	  results	   in	  reduction	  in	  their	  concen-­‐tration	  and	  reduced	  inhibitory	  activity,	  which	  allow	  expression	  to	  resume.	  This	  capacity	  for	  mental	  animation	  is,	  however,	  limited,	  and	  to	  determine	  what	  the	  activity	  will	  be,	  especially	  when	  the	  other	  components	  are	  included,	  researchers	  often	  turn	  to	  computational	  models,	  generating	   what	   Abrahamsen	   and	   I	   (Bechtel	   &	   Abrahamsen,	   2010)	   refer	   to	   as	   dynamic	  
mechanistic	  explanations.	  Even	  here,	  though,	  diagrams	  provide	  a	  reference	  point	  in	  the	  con-­‐struction	   of	   equations	   describing	   operation	   of	   the	   various	   parts	   (Jones	   &	  Wolkenhauer,	  2012).	  	  Looking	  carefully	  at	  the	  lower	  right	  side	  of	  the	  figure,	  one	  will	  see	  two	  ovals	  with	  question	  marks	   in	   them.	   This	   indicates	   that	   the	   researchers	   suspected	   that	   something	   unknown	  binds	  with	  CRY	  before	  and	  potentially	  mediates	  its	  binding	  with	  FBXL3,	  which	  then	  results	  in	  its	  degradation.	  Here	  it	  is	  the	  identity	  of	  an	  entity	  that	  is	  in	  doubt,	  but	  sometimes	  ques-­‐tion	  marks	  are	  employed	  to	  indicate	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  identity	  of	  an	  operation.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  diagram	  is	  from	  a	  review	  paper	  and	  the	  question	  mark	  reflects	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  discipline.	  On	  occasions	  when	  question	  marks	  appear	  in	  mechanism	  diagrams	  presented	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	   a	   researcher	  paper	   they	  signal	   that	   the	  goal	  of	   the	  paper	   is	   to	  answer	  a	  question	  regarding	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  component	  or	  its	  operation.	  	  
4.2	  Cognitive	  science	  research	  relevant	  to	  reasoning	  with	  mechanism	  diagrams	  
	  Although	  cognitive	  scientists	  have	  not	  explicitly	  focused	  on	  mechanism	  diagrams	  that	  fig-­‐ure	  in	  biology,6	  research	  on	  simple	  mechanical	  systems	  such	  as	  pulley	  systems	  (already	  the	  focus	  of	  Larkin	  and	  Simon’s	  research	  discussed	  above)	  has	  highlighted	  one	  of	  the	  important	  cognitive	  activities	  people	  use	  with	  mechanism	  diagrams—mentally	  animating	  the	  opera-­‐tion	  of	  a	  mechanism	  when	  trying	  to	  figure	  out	  how	  it	  will	  behave.	  Drawing	  on	  theorists	  in	  the	   mental	   models	   tradition	   (see	   papers	   in	   Gentner	   &	   Stevens,	   1983,	   that	   explore	   how	  people	  answer	  problems	  by	  constructing	  and	  running	  a	  mental	  model),	  Hegarty	  (1992)	  in-­‐vestigated	   experimentally	   “to	   what	   extent	   the	   mental	   processes	   involved	   in	   reasoning	  about	  a	  mechanical	  system	  are	  isomorphic	  to	  the	  physical	  processes	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  system.”	  She	  measured	  reaction	  times	  and	  eye	  movements	  as	  participants	  answered	  ques-­‐tions	  about	  how	  various	  parts	  of	  a	  pulley	  systems	  such	  as	  shown	   in	  Figure	  10	  would	  be-­‐have	  if	  the	  rope	  is	  pulled.	  From	  the	  fact	  that	  both	  error	  rates	  and	  reaction	  times	  increased	  with	  the	  number	  of	  operations	  within	  the	  mechanism	  the	  participant	  had	  to	  animate	  in	  or-­‐der	  to	  answer	  the	  question,	  she	  inferred	  that	  people	  don’t	  simulate	  the	  whole	  machine	  op-­‐erating	  at	  once	  but	  rather	  animate	  individual	  parts	  in	  sequence.	  She	  provided	  further	  evi-­‐dence	   for	   this	   claim	   by	   tracking	   the	  movements	   of	   the	   participants’	   eyes	   as	   they	   solved	  problems.	   In	   a	   follow-­‐up	   experiment,	   Hegarty	   compared	   performance	  when	   participants	  were	  asked	  to	  infer	  the	  motion	  of	  a	  component	  from	  that	  of	  another	  component	  earlier	  in	  the	  causal	  chain	  or	  from	  that	  of	  a	  component	  later	  in	  the	  chain.	  Participants	  made	  more	  er-­‐rors	  and	  required	  more	  time	  when	  they	  had	  to	  reason	  backwards	  from	  events	  later	  in	  the	  chain,	  and	  still	  showed	  a	  preference	  to	  move	  their	  eyes	  forward	  along	  the	  causal	  chain.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Stieff,	  Hegarty,	  and	  Dixon	  (2010)	  have	  explored	  strategies	  used	  to	  transform	  diagrams	  of	  molecular	  structure	  used	  in	  organic	  chemistry.	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  Figure	  10.	  Pulley	  problem	  Hegarty	  used	  to	  study	  how	  people	  employ	  mental	  anima-­‐tion	  in	  problem	  solving.	  	  Schwartz	   and	   Black	   (1996)	   provided	   further	   insights	   into	   how	   people	   simulate	   mecha-­‐nisms	  by	  attending	  to	  the	  gestures	  people	  make.	  In	  one	  task,	  shown	  on	  the	  left	  below,	  par-­‐ticipants	  were	  asked	  to	  determine	  in	  which	  direction	  the	  rightmost	  gear	  would	  turn	  given	  the	  clockwise	  turn	  of	  the	  leftmost	  gear.	  They	  found	  that	  their	  participants	  would	  use	  their	  hands	  to	  indicate	  the	  direction	  of	  movement	  of	  each	  successive	  gear.	  (In	  these	  studies	  the	  participants	   never	   saw	   the	   diagrams	   but	   were	   provided	  with	   verbal	   descriptions	   of	   the	  configuration.)	   In	  this	  case,	  an	  alternative	  strategy	  is	  available:	  apply	  a	  simple	  global	  rule	  such	  as	  the	  parity	  rule:	  “if	  there	  are	  an	  odd	  number	  of	  gears,	  the	  first	  and	  last	  will	  turn	  in	  the	  same	  direction”	  or	  the	  more	  local	  rule	  “if	  two	  gears	  are	  touching,	  they	  will	  turn	  in	  oppo-­‐site	  directions.”	  Schwartz	  and	  Black	  found	  that	  as	  people	  acquired	  the	  rule,	  their	  gestures	  declined.	  But	  when	  people	  lack	  such	  rules	  or	  find	  their	  application	  uncertain,	  as	  in	  the	  gear	  problem	  on	   the	   right	   in	   Figure	   11,	   they	   again	   gesture.	   This	   use	   of	   gesture	   indicates	   that	  whatever	  imagery	  people	  employ	  to	  solve	  the	  task,	  it	  is	  coordinated	  with	  action.	  According-­‐ly,	   the	   researchers	   propose	   a	   theory	   of	   simulated	   doing	   in	  which	   “the	   representation	   of	  physical	   causality	   is	   fundamental.	   This	   is	   because	   ‘doing’	   requires	   taking	   advantage	   of	  causal	  forces	  and	  constraints	  to	  manipulate	  the	  world.	  Our	  assumption	  is	  that	  people	  need	  to	  have	  representations	  of	  how	  their	  embodied	  ideas	  will	  cause	  physical	  changes	  if	  they	  are	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals”	  (Schwartz	  &	  Black,	  1999).	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  Figure	  11.	  Gear	  problem	  used	  by	  Schwartz	  and	  Black	  (1996)	  to	  study	  when	  partici-­‐pants	  gesture	  while	  solving	  problems.	  	  Animating	  a	  diagram,	  either	  mentally	  or	  with	  gesture,	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  cognitive	  activity	  of	  understanding	  how	  a	  proposed	  mechanism	  could	  produce	  the	  phenomenon	  one	  is	  trying	  to	  explain.	  But	  diagrams	  present	  not	  only	  a	  finished	  explanation	  of	  the	  phenome-­‐non,	  they	  often	  figure	  in	  the	  process	  of	  discovering	  mechanisms.	  Here	  what	  matters	  is	  the	  ability	   to	   create	   and	   alter	   the	   glyphs	   and	   their	   arrangement.	   Tversky	   (2011)	   suggests	   a	  helpful	  way	   to	  understand	   this	   activity—view	  diagrams	  as	   the	   “permanent	   traces	  of	   ges-­‐tures”	   in	  which	  “fleeting	  positions	  become	  places	  and	   fleeting	  actions	  become	  marks	  and	  forms”	  (p.	  500).	  There	  is	  a	  rich	  literature	  showing	  how	  gesture	  figures	  not	  only	  in	  commu-­‐nication	   but	   also	   in	   the	   development	   of	   one’s	   own	   understanding	   (Goldin-­‐Meadow	   &	  Wagner,	  2005).	  Tversky	  focuses	  on	  the	  activity	  of	  drawing	  maps,	  highlighting	  such	  features	  of	   the	   activity	   as	   selecting	  what	   features	   to	   include	   and	   idealizing	   angles	   to	   right	   angles.	  These	   findings	   can	   be	   extended	   to	  mechanism	   diagrams,	   which	   constitute	   a	   map	   of	   the	  functional	   space	   of	   the	   mechanism,	   situating	   its	   parts	   and	   operations.	   While	   Tversky	  speaks	  of	  diagrams	  as	  permanent	  traces	  and	  there	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  permanence	  (or	  at	  least	  en-­‐durance)	  to	  diagrams	  produced	  on	  paper	  or	  in	  computer	  files,	  they	  are	  also	  subject	  to	  revi-­‐sion—one	  can	  add	  glyphs	  for	  additional	  parts	  or	  alter	  arrows	  to	  represent	  different	  ideas	  of	  how	  the	  operations	  of	  one	  part	  affect	  others.	  In	  the	  design	  literature	  this	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	   sketching.	   Sketching	  mechanism	  diagrams	   can	  be	  motivated	  by	  evidence,	  but	   they	   can	  also	  be	  done	  in	  a	  purely	  exploratory	  manner,	  enabling	  reasoning	  about	  what	  would	  happen	  if	   a	  new	  connection	  were	  made	  or	   an	  existing	  one	   redirected.	   Sketching	  possible	  mecha-­‐nisms	  is	  a	  common	  activity	  of	  scientists,	  and	  by	  further	  investigating	  the	  cognitive	  activities	  involved	  in	  this	  activity	  one	  can	  develop	  richer	  analyses	  of	  this	  important	  type	  of	  scientific	  reasoning.	  	  
5.	  Conclusions	  and	  Future	  Tasks	  	  This	  chapter	  has	  addressed	  the	  use	  of	  diagrams	  by	  scientists	  in	  characterizing	  phenomena	  to	  be	  explained,	   identifying	  variables	   that	   figure	   in	  explaining	   those	  phenomena,	   and	  ad-­‐vancing	   proposals	   for	   mechanisms,	   drawing	   examples	   from	   circadian	   rhythm	   research.	  Over	  the	  last	  thirty	  years	  cognitive	  scientists	  have	  attempted	  to	  characterize	  cognitive	  ac-­‐tivities	  people	  employ	  when	  perceiving	  and	  using	  diagrams	  in	  problem	  solving	  tasks,	  such	  as	  making	  multiple	  scans	  of	  graphs	  and	  animating	  mechanical	  diagrams.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  cognitive	   scientists	   have	   employed	   diagrams	   and	   tasks	   in	   their	   studies	   that	   are	   simpler	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  than	  those	  that	  figure	  in	  actual	  scientific	  research.	  But	  these	  cognitive	  science	  studies	  none-­‐theless	   provide	   insights	   into	   the	   cognitive	   processes	   that	   figure	   in	   scientists’	   use	   of	   dia-­‐grams.	  To	  date	  the	  roles	  diagrams	  play	  in	  science	  has	  not	  figured	  in	  a	  major	  way	  in	  philo-­‐sophical	  accounts	  of	  scientific	  reasoning	  but	  given	  the	  important	  roles	  diagrams	  play	  in	  sci-­‐ence,	  there	  is	  great	  potential	  to	  advance	  our	  understanding	  of	  scientific	  reasoning	  by	  inves-­‐tigating	   further	   the	  cognitive	  processes	   involved	  as	   scientists	   create	  and	  use	  diagrams	   in	  the	  course	  of	  their	  research.	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